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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, 
CATHERINE NALDER and 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8529 
This case was before this court on appeal from the 
District Court of Davis County, Utah, as Case No. 8313. 
The opinion in the former appeal reversed the trial court 
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and ordered a new trial and was handed down on October 
11, 1955, and is reported in 4 Utah 2d 117, 288 Pac. 2d 
456. The facts in this appeal are substantially the same 
as in the former appeal. This proceeding is an appeal 
from the same court in which a judgment was rendered, 
this time upon the verdict of a jury, in favor of the re-
spondents and against this appellant. 
The respondents will be referred to hereafter as 
plaintiffs and appellant as defendant. 
By its former opinion, this court ruled, that since 
the defendant, Nalder, Jr., signed none of the real estate 
mortgages which are, in part, the subject of this litiga-
tion, no judgment for damages for failure on the part of 
the defendant to release such mortgages could be awarded 
in his favor. Notwithstanding that mandate the trial 
court made no attempt to differentiate between damages 
flowing from the failure to release real estate mortgages 
and defendant's failure to release chattel mortgages and 
the jury was permitted to find the issue of damages in 
Nalder, Jr.'s favor without regard to the law of the case 
established by this court on that phase of the controversy. 
This court further ruled on the former appeal that 
Nalder, Jr. could have no award of damages based upon 
the failure of defendant to release any mortgages for any 
period after he ceased doing business as a turkey grower. 
On the mistaken theory that the evidence upon retrial 
showed that Nalder, Jr. was attempting to engage in the 
turkey business during all of the time complained of by 
the plaintiffs, the trial court permitted the jury to award 
damages to him covering a period after which he had 
ceased to engage in that business or attempted to do so. 
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We shall have more to say regarding this aspect of the 
case hereafter. 
Plaintiffs by this action seek recovery of alleged dam-
ages to their business as turkey raisers occurring in 19 52, 
1953 and 1954. They assert damage was caused by the 
failure of the defendant to release three chattel mortgages 
signed by N alder, Sr. and N alder, Jr. and two real estate 
mortgages executed by Nalder, Sr. and his wife and de-
livered to the defendant in connection with turkey financ-
ing agreements in 1949, 1950 and 1951. (Ex. A 1-3 and 
A 7-8) A third real estate mortgage was also given to 
defendant. (Ex. A 10) It was admitted by plaintiffs 
without dispute that that mortgage_ was a valid subsisting 
obligation which defendant was entitled to maintain of 
record. It amounted to $6,555.12 plus $3,600.00 for 
£it~}t~'fe advances. 
The case was tried upon plaintiffs' contention that 
because defendant did not release these mortgages, N alder, 
Sr. and Nalder, Jr. were prevented from securing turkey 
financing from other companies, thus preventing them 
from raising the number of turkeys in 1952, 1953 and 
1954, which they intended to and were capable of raising. 
They declare that it was their intention to raise 14,000 
turkeys in each of those years and that they would have 
realized a profit of $64,850.40 which they lost as the 
result of defendant's alleged wrongdoing. (R. 1-2) (Tr. 
81-84, 296, 303, 305) 
The record shows that plaintiffs never raised more 
than 6,000 turkeys in any year, even with the identical 
facilities which they now contend would have been used 
by them to raise 14,000 turkeys. The record further shows 
that during the three years preceding 1952, plaintiffs en-
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gaged in the turkey business at an overall loss. In none 
of those years did the turkey business yield plaintiffs any 
substantial profit. 
Defendant denied the alleged wrong and that plain-
tiffs had suffered any damage by reason of anything done 
or omitted by defendant, and counterclaimed to foreclose 
its third real estate mortgage. (Ex. A 10) (R. 3-10) 
Since no attempt was made by plaintiffs to contest the 
amount owing defendant on its counterclaim, defendant 
was awarded judgment for the full amount demanded, 
including attorneys' fees. The amount thus granted to 
defendant was deducted from the jury's verdict of $22,-
030.61 and judgment was finally entered in favor of 
Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. for the net amount of $14,-
739.09 plus $150.00 penalty. (R. 16) It is from that 
judgment and other rulings of the trial court that this 
appeal is prosecuted. 
At the conclusion of the evidence defendant made a 
motion for a directed verdict. The court took the motion 
under advisement (Tr. 514-517) and after verdict and 
judgment on the verdit, denied the motion. (R. 18) 
Within the proper time after judgment defendant 
filed its motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, 
or for a new trial. ( R. 17) Those motions were like-
wise denied. ( R. 18) 
In addition, on March 2 7, 19 56, the court granted 
plaintiffs' motion to retax costs which defendant claimed 
by a cost bill filed December 1 0, 19 55, following reversal 
in the former appeal. (R. 23) The court struck from 
defendant's cost bill on appeal the items of $682.84 which 
was the cost of the supersedeas bond required on the 
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former appeal and $19.80 charged for the filing of the 
record on appeal. 
It is undisputed that prior to 1949 Nalder, Sr. made 
preparations to go into the turkey business. Neither he 
nor his son, H. William Nalder, Jr., had engaged in that 
business before that time. (Tr. 21) In that year Nalder, 
Sr. and Nalder, Jr. entered into a partnership and com-
menced business. (Tr. 22, 23) They were financially 
unable to carry on business without credit. For each of 
the years 1949, 1950 and 1951 they entered into contracts 
with defendant, whereby, in exchange for their agree-
ment to use defendant's turkey feed preparations, de-
fendant agreed to advance the price of turkey poults and 
the necessary feed to grow and mature them for market. 
Exhibits B 2 and B 3 constituted the contract for 1949 
and the contracts for 1950 and 1951 contained the same 
provisions except for the necessary variations of amount 
and year. 
To secure the defendant for its advances Nalder, Sr. 
and Nalder, Jr., each year for the three years in which 
defendant provided the financing, signed and delivered 
to defendant promissory notes evidencing advances made 
by defendant and secured those notes by chattel mort-
gages upon the turkeys and the machinery, feed and 
equipment used in the business. Those chattel mortgages 
are part of the record as Exhibits A 1, A 2 and A 3. 
It is not disputed that defendant provided all of the 
plaintiffs' required financing for 1949, 1950 and 1951. · 
In addition to chattel mortgage financing the de-
fendant provided supplemental financing for which real 
estate mortgages were taken as security upon the real 
estate of Catherine N alder. (Ex. A 7-13 ) This was neces-
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sary because the chattel mortgage financing was insuf-
ficient to mature the turkeys and was furnished by 
defendant upon plaintiffs' request. 
For the sole purpose of creating the impression with 
the jury that defendant was oppressive in its dealings with 
plain~iffs and did not act in good faith, plaintiffs con-
tended that the defendant exacted notes and mortgages 
exceeding the actual amounts advanced to them. The 
contention is that defendant demanded notes and mort-
gages in double the amount actually requested or needed. 
(Tr. 56,150) As a matter of fact, prior to September 
14, 1949, plaintiffs requested an additional $2,000.00 and 
offered real estate in the name of Mrs. N alder as security. 
Because it was anticipated that additional funds might 
be needed, a mortgage was taken for $4,000.00. (Ex. A 7) 
(Tr. 363,365,367) Under that mortgage not $2,000.00 
but $5,500.00 was actually advanced. (Tr. 369) (Ex. E) 
In April, 19 50, another real estate mortgage was 
taken on the same property. (Ex. A 8) Prior to that 
date defendant had made advances to plaintiffs in the 
amount of $6,721.80 which was in addition to chattel 
mortgage financing and that real estate mortgage was to 
secure those additional advances. (Tr. 141,370) (Ex. E) 
Nevertheless, H. William Nalder denied having re-
ceived any advances under that mortgage. (Tr. 57) 
Again on August 15, 1950, a real estate mortgage 
was taken to secure anticipated further advances of 
$3,600.00 (Ex. A 10) Under that mortgage over $3,600.00 
was advanced by defendants. (Tr. 371) (Ex. E) It was 
the sworn testimony of the plaintiffs that the third real 
estate mortgage was given for the sole purpose of merg-
ing the balance due from the 1949 indebtedness which 
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amounted to $6,555.12 and upon a promise that all prior 
mortgages would be released. (Tr. 60-62, 214-215, 216) 
Timely objections were made to that evidence and were 
overruled by the court notwithstanding there was no foun-
dation showing that the defendant's agent who was pur-
ported to have made the promise had any authority to 
make it and in the face of testimony and evidence that he 
had no such authority. (Tr. 60, 214, 44-54, 3 39) (Ex. 
c 4, 5, 6, 7.5, 8) 
In none of the years that the plaintiffs raised turkeys 
with the aid of defendant's financing were they able to 
make a substantial profit. The operation in 1949 resulted 
in a loss of over $6,000.00 (Ex. C 4, 5. Ex. D 4, 8. Ex. E) 
(Tr. 65, 69) In 1950 they succeeded in repaying all ad-
vances made for that year and about $1,000.00 over, which 
was applied on the 1949 deficit. (Ex. D 4, 8. Ex. E) 
(Tr. 69) In 1951 they were even less successful. They 
made only about $400.00 more than the total cost of that 
year's operation. (Ex. E) In 1951 in a letter written to 
defendant the plaintiffs confessed themselves as failures 
in the turkey business. (Ex. D 4) 
In no year did the plaintiffs ever raise more than 
6,000 turkeys. Yet in this case they would have the court 
believe it was their intention and that they actually would 
have raised 14,000 turkeys had defendant not prevented 
them from getting the necessary financing. The only year 
in which they made any attempt to get financing for 
14,000 turkeys was 1952. (Ex. G 2 and H 1) 
At the end of 1951 defendant declined to finance 
plaintiffs any longer. Plainti'ffs had failed to substantially 
reduce the amount of their indebtedness from the 1949 
operation. In addition, irregularities were, discovered in 
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their dealings with defendant. They had sold turkeys 
covered by defendant's 1951 chattel mortgage and had 
not accounted for the proceeds. (Ex. D 4-8, D 11-13) 
(Tr. 66) As a matter of fact they have never fully ac-
counted to defendant to this day for all of the turkeys 
which they illegally sold. (Tr. 379, 149) They knew per-
fectly well that they had no right to sell those mortgaged 
turkeys or to divert the proceeds to other uses than the 
payment of their obligations to defendant. (Ex. D 4, 5) 
(Tr. 68, 148, 218, 219) They made a full written confes-
sion of their wrongdoing in November, 1951. (Ex. D 4-8) 
The money they received from those sales was used to pay 
claims of other creditors who were pressing them for pay-
ment or threatening to take judgments. (Ex. D 4, 5) 
(Tr. 68, 70, 148) At the trial the plaintiffs tried to make 
it appear that those turkeys had been sold because by so 
doing they were able to get more money for them. (Tr. 
66, 146) On cross examination they were forced to admit 
the real motives behind their actions. 
It was for those reasons plus the fact that defendant 
could no longer provide the type of financing which plain-
tiffs required that defendant declined to finance plaintiffs 
any longer. (Tr. 423, 458) 
Late in the fall of 1951 a conference was held be-
tween Mr. and Mrs. Nalder, Sr. and Messrs. Williams and 
Aust representing the defendant. The purpose of the meet-
ing was to discuss the liquidation of the amount owing 
defendant. The meeting took place in the Hotel Utah. The 
Nalders claim that when the subject of 1952 financing 
came up for discussion Mr. Williams not only refused 
to extend further credit, but went further and threatened 
that he would prevent the Nalders from getting credit 
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from anyone else. (Tr. 73, 74, 80, 151, 222, 230) Mr. 
Williams and Mr. Aust both emphatically deny such a 
threat. (Tr. 423, 424, 458) If made and carried out it 
would have almost certainly forever foreclosed the only 
hope which defendant had of ever getting its money and 
defendant well knew this to be so. (Tr. 461) The obvious 
purpose of the accusations made by the plaintiffs was 
again to make it appear to the jury that defendant was 
guilty of bad faith. The evidence clearly demonstrates 
that no such threat to plaintiffs' credit was ever made. 
The record shows that the plaintiffs themselves are 
not in unity about the matter of a threat having been 
made. H. William Nalder, Jr. wrote a letter to defendant 
couched in extreme opposite terms than his parents testi-
fied. (Ex. D 14) In that letter he states that his father 
told him that defendant would permit other financing ar-
rangements to be made by plaintiffs and asks the defendant 
to confirm the understanding. Furthermore, he testified 
to the same effect. (Tr. 324, 325) Yet H. William Nalder, 
Sr. denied under oath that he ever told his son the very 
thing which H. William Nalder, Jr. wrote to defendant 
about. (Tr. 151) Responsive to that letter defendant con-
firmed its willingness to permit other financing and ex-
pressed its willingness to subordinate its claim to anyone 
willing to provide financing. That offer was repeatedly 
renewed and was never withdrawn. (Tr. 152) (Ex. D 
16-23) (Tr. 299, 324) Defendant attached as a condition 
to its agreement to subordinate that plaintiffs pay $352.00 
which represented the value of mortgaged turkeys which 
had been wrongfully delivered to a service station operator 
to satisfy an unpaid account for gas and oil which Nalder, 
Jr. owed and had failed to pay. (Ex. D 17, 19) (Tr. 154, 
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155, 301, 302, 323, 325) The plaintiffs not only recog-
nized the condition to be reasonable but attempted to 
comply with it. Furthermore, there was an exchange of 
perfectly friendly correspondence after this alleged threat 
was made. (Ex. D 10.5, 21.5) 
During the trial the matter of the efforts of plain-
tiffs to secure other financing was testified to at great 
length. It appears that Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. made 
separate and individual applications to different feed 
manufacturers. It was asserted that this was done in the 
full knowledge that if made jointly the applications would 
have been refused. (Tr. 296) 
In 1952 Nalder, Jr. made an application to Farmer's 
Grain (Ex. H) and one to the Pillsbury Company. There 
is in the record absolutely no evidence as to why those 
applications were rejected. (Tr. 305, 322, 323) Conse-
quently, there is no proof that they were rejected because 
defendant did not release its mortgages. 
Also in 1952 another application was made by Nalder, 
Jr. to General Mills (Ex. F) and there is considerable evi-
dence as to why it was not approved. It requested financ-
ing for 5,000 turkeys, not 14,000. (Ex. F 1) Many un-
favorable factors are revealed by the record and are graph-
ically portrayed in Exhibit F 6. It is conceded that one of 
the conditions for approval was a release or subordination 
of defendant's mortgages. But in addition the matter of H. 
William Nalder, Jr.'s credit reputation was seriously ques-
tioned. (Tr. 111, 122) Also his involvement in litigation 
and a poor paying record and other n1ortgages and debts. 
(Tr. 117, 122-124) Furthermore, he was to be strictly 
limited in his operations to 5,000 birds, not 9,000 which 
he con tends he was going to raise. ( T r. 115, 121 ) In ad-
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clition, a guarantee which was an absolute requirement for 
approval was never obtained by him. (Tr. 115, 116, 126, 
127, 13 3) Mr. Stevens, credit manager of General Mills, 
was called by plaintiffs and despite counsel's repeated 
efforts to get him to do so he refused to state that Nalder's 
application would have been approved if defendant had 
released or subordinated its debt. (Tr. 128) The record 
does not support the contention that the application 
would have been approved if defendant had released its 
mortgages. It is significant to note that the turkey proc-
essor with whom the plaintiffs had done business for two 
or three years would not advance even $352.00 to Nalder, 
Jr. in order for him to get a subordination from defend-
ant. (Tr. 302, 324) Here was a man who knew the plain-
tiff as well as anyone who had no confidence that he would 
get his money back even if he loaned them only this small 
amount. 
The record is likewise clear that Nalder, Jr. aban-
doned any further efforts to finance turkeys after 1952. 
(Tr. 309) In spite of such abandonment the jury was per-
mitted to find that Nalder, Jr. was damaged in turkey 
operations in the years 1953 and 1954 because defendant 
did not release its mortgages. 
We turn now to the credit applications made by 
Nalder, Sr. to Ralston Purina Company in 1952, 1953 and 
1954. The application of 1953 was not produced but he 
testified it was for 1,300 to 2,000 turkeys. (Tr. 156, 204) 
The exact number is indefinite. 
He had attempted to get financing for 5,000 turkeys 
in 1952 (Ex. G 2) but when this was not approved he 
reduced his request hoping it would be approved and in 
1954 his application was for only 2,000 turkeys (Ex. 
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G 3), not 5,000 or 14,000. The evidence is that in 1953 
and 1954 he tried to get :financing for no more than 
2,000 turkeys. Here again we point out that despite this 
evidence the plaintiffs were permitted to go to the jury 
upon the theory that they intended to raise 14,000 turkeys 
in 1952, 1953 and 1954 and that they would have been 
successful except for defendant's alleged wrongdoing. 
The record indicates clearly that the applications of 
Nalder, Sr. to Ralston Purina were rejected for much the 
same reasons that Nalder, Jr's. application was denied by 
General Mills. They were: ( 1) Bad credit rating and 
pending litigation. (Ex. L 11, 13, 14) (Tr. 96, 478-82, 
499, 508, 509) (2) Lack of character and reputation. 
(Ex. L 15) ( 3) The existence of other mortgage in-
debtedness. (Tr. 492, 493) (4) All other factors af-
fecting credit. (Tr. 499, 510, 511) 
It was not the existence of unreleased Kellog mort-
gages which was responsible for the denial of credit ap-
plications. (Tr. 497, 500) That a release or subordina-
tion of defendant's mortgages would have been necessary 
in the event the application was accepted is not disputed. 
(Tr. 483, 492) The evidence is that these applications 
were denied solely because Nalder, Sr. was considered to 
be an undesirable individual to do business with. He did 
get financing for 1,000 to 2,000 turkeys in 1952, 1953 
and 1954, but only upon a guarantee of his obligation by 
Rasmussen, his feed dealer. First Security Bank would not 
accept him upon the strength of his own credit reputation 
or assets. (Tr. 271, 272) 
It is undisputed that credit men do not deny credit 
applications because an applicant may have unreleased 
mortgages outstanding in any amount. Of much greater 
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importance is the amount of the debt which underlies 
such recorded instruments. Unreleased mortgages are only 
an indication of the existence of a possible debt which an 
applicant may owe. (Tr. 119, 122, 125, 322, 388, 459, 
460) 
We cannot pass this phase of the case without allud-
ing to the record of false and incomplete credit informa-
tion supplied by N alder, Sr. to Ralston Purina. He signed 
the financial statements, which are Exhibits G 1 and G 5, 
certifying that they were complete, accurate and truthful. 
The only indebtedness which he disclosed was to Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan Association. He made no men-
tion whatever of the debt owing defendant nor did he 
mention the existence of numerous chattel and real estate 
mortgages and judgments outstanding to other creditors. 
He knew the information contained in his application 
was untrue. (Tr. 157-163, 165-168, 169, 170) He ex-
cused his conduct in this regard by stating that he noti-
fied Wheelwright, a Ralston Purina Agent, of the exist-
ence of those debts and omitted them upon Wheelwright's 
suggestion and advice. Significantly he failed to call 
Wheelwright to testify in corroboration of this statement. 
The existence of those mortgages and judgments, 
many of which had not been released or satisfied when 
the applications for credit were made, is amply supported 
by the record. (Tr. 572-575, 491, 275-283) They total 
some eighteen separate items. Many of them were unre-
leased at the time of trial. 
One of the important issues in this case is whether a 
demand was ever made by plaintiffs that defendant re-
lease its mortgages, assuming that they had been paid and 
satisfied and plaintiffs were entitled to releases, which de-
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fendant specifically denied. The record is bare of any evi-
dence that any demand was ever made for a release of the 
real estate mortgages. Furthermore, with respect to the 
real estate mortgages the record shows conclusively that 
plaintiffs were not entitled to releases. The mortgages 
dated April 1, 1950, and August 15, 1950, (Ex. A 8, 
A 10) both expressly provided that they were to secure 
all indebtedness then existing or accruing thereafter by 
all the plaintiffs to the defendant until the same was paid 
in full. The debt owing to defendant never having been 
paid in full those mortgages were never in fact satisfied 
and hence defendant was under no obligation to release 
them. Those mortgages totaled $13,276.92. The validity 
of the mortgage of August 15, 1950, (Ex. A 10) is con-
ceded. The jury was permitted to take into account the 
fact that the mortgage of April 1, 1950, (Ex. A 8) was 
not released as a basis for damages. 
No demand for release of chattel mortgages was made 
prior to 1954. (Tr. 208-213, 241, 257) The only evidence 
even remotely resembling a demand prior to 1954 is con-
tained in the testimony of Nalder, Jr. (Tr. 318) The most 
that can be said for his testimony is that on that occasion, 
November, 1950, the subject of a release was discussed. 
That discussion pertained to a settlement of the 1950 ac-
count and the record clearly shows that the defendant's 
agent, Mrs. Schinker, advised that no mortgages would be 
released until authorized by defendant's general manager. 
(Ex. C 9, C 10) (Tr. 314, 315, 318, 338, 339, 342) Mrs. 
Schinker had no authority to releaese mortgages or to 
commit defendant to make a release. It is not even pre-
tended that any other demand for a release of chattel 
mortgages was made after November, 1950, and until 
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1954. (Tr. 320-322) Hence there is no evidence of any 
demand ever having been made to release the 1951 chat-
tel mortgage (Ex A 3) which was for $42,825.00 In the 
absence of this vital evidence the jury was permitted to 
find issues in favor of plaintiffs that defendant's failure 
to release chattel mortgages was unlawful and could form 
the basis for an award of damages. Releases of the chattel 
mortgages were executed January 21, 1954, and they were 
filed March 11, 1954. (Ex. A 4-6) (Tr. 456-7) 
In connection with the subject of a demand for re-
lease the plaintiffs asserted that they had been led to be-
lieve that all but the third real estate mortgage (Ex. A 1 0) 
had been released. They assert they first made the discovery 
that this had not been done in 1954. (Tr. 208-213, 241, 
257) The documentary evidence will not support the 
plaintiffs in this assertion. They were advised in writing 
as early as February, 1952, and as late as June, 1953, that 
the mortgages had not been released and could not be 
released until they accounted for the balance of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the mortgaged turkeys. (Ex. D 14, 
D 21.5, D 22, D 23) Exhibit C 10 advised the plaintiffs 
that the mortgages dated before December, 1950, would 
not be released until approved by defendant's general man-
ager. 
Defendant in retaining all of its mortgages of record 
was acting in accordance with its usual business practice 
and policy of not releasing any mortgages until indebted-
ness owing it was paid in full. This policy was adopted 
and in use at the time in question upon the advice and in-
struction of counsel. Counsel had advised the defendant 
that the release of any mortgages prior to the full pay-
ment of indebtedness would jeopardize defendant's rights. 
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(Tr. 336, 337, 357, 377, 432-434, 448, 449, 451, 462) 
Certainly animosity or desire to injure plaintiffs played 
no part in defendant's decision not to release these mort-
gages. (Tr. 461) Defendant acted in good faith in what 
it did. 
During the trial numerous objections to the intro-
duction of evidence and the propriety of counsel's ques-
tions were raised to no avail. Also exceptions were taken 
to several of the court's instructions and his refusal to give 
requested instructions. These matters will be referred to 
and discussed hereafter. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PERMIT-
TING THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., FOR DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED 
WRONGFUL FAILURE TO RELEASE REAL ESTATE MORT-
GAGES AND IN PERMITTING THE INTRODUCTION OF 
EVIDENCE THAT SAID PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN OR AT-
TEMPTED TO ENGAGE IN THE TURKEY BUSINESS AFTER 
MAY OF 1952 CONTRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF 
THE CASE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PERMIT-
TING THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS, 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., 
BECAUSE OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE OR RE-
FUSAL TO· RELEASE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES BECAUSE 
NO DEMAND OR REQUEST FOR SUCH RELEASES WAS 
EVER MADE AND FOR THE AD'DITIONAL REASON THAT 
SAID PLAINTIFFS NEVER PAID OR OTHERWISE DIS-
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CHARGED THE OBLIGATIONS SECURED BY SAID MORT-
GAGES. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY PERMIT-
TING THE JURY TO AWARD 'DAMAGES FOR DEFENDANT'S 
FAILURE TO RELEASE CHATTEL MORTGAGES: (a) BE-
CAUSE NO DEMAND FOR RELEASE WAS MADE PRIOR TO 
1954. (b) BECAUSE EACH CHATTEL MORTGAGE SECURED 
THE PRIOR UNPAID DEBT OF PLAINTIFFS, H. WILLIAM 
NALDER, SR. AND H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR. HENCE, NO 
RELEASE COULD BE DEMANDED. (c) BECAUSE THERE IS 
NO EVIDENCE THAT SAID PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT HAVE 
SECURED FINANCING IN 1954 AFTER THE RELEASE OF 
SAID CHATTEL MORTGAGES ON MARCH 11, 1954. (d) 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT 
PLAINTIFF, H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., ABANDONED THE 
RAISING OF TURKEYS IN 1952 AND NEVER ENGAGED 
IN THE TURKEY BUSINESS THEREAFTER. (e) BECAUSE 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF, H. WILLIAM 
NALDER, SR., OBTAINED FINANCING IN 1953 AND 1954 
ON ALL TURKEYS FOR WHICH HE MADE ANY APPLI-
CATION FOR FINANCING. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPLY-
lNG AN IMPROPER RULE OF DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS> 
CLAIM OF LOSS OF ANTICIPATED PROFITS FOR THE 
YEARS 1952, 1953 and 1954. 
POINTV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN RECEIV-
lNG IN EVIDENCE PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS 1-1, I-2, Q, R and 
N 1-4 FOR THE REASON THAT SAID EXHIBITS WERE IN-
COMPETENT, IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL AND NO 
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THEIR ADMISSION 
IN EVIDENCE. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE EITHER 
REAL ESTATE OR CHATTEL MORTGAGES WAS THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY LOSS TO PLAINTIFFS, H. 
WILLIAM NALDER, SR. OR H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S jUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES 
THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE IN-
TRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OVER DEFENDANT'S OR-
JECTION THAT SCOVILLE AND SCHINKER PROMISED OR 
AGREED ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE 
MORTGAGES WITH NO PRELIMINARY SHOWING OF 
AGENCY OR AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH PROMISE AND 
FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT UNCONTROVERTED 
TESTIMONY ESTABLISHES THAT SCOVILLE AN'D SCHINKER 
HAD NO SUCH AUTHORITY. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MO-
TIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING VERDICT OR FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT X 
THE COURT ERRE'D IN CERTAIN OF ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY AND IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE CER-
TAIN OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
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POINT XI 
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING CERTAIN ITEMS 
OF DEFENDANT'S COST BILL ON APPEAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF, 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR., FOR DEFENDANT'S 
ALLEGED ~RONGFUL FAILURE TO RELEASE 
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES AND IN PERMIT-
TING THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT 
SAID PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN OR ATTEMPTED 
TO ENGAGE IN THE TURKEY BUSINESS AFTER 
MAY OF 1952, CONTRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED 
LAW OF THE CASE. 
In its opinion in the former appeal in this case, 
4 Utah 2d, 117, 288 Pac. 456, this court stated: 
uNalder, Jr. did not sign any of the real estate 
mortgages and consequently, any award to him for 
the Kellog Company's failure to release these mort-
gages is without basis. Nor can he recover dam-
ages beyond the period when he actually engaged 
in, or tried to engage in, the turkey business." 
This court further found upon the record in the 
former appeal that: 
uln 1952 Nalder, Jr. was unable to obtain fi-
nancing for further turkey raising and turned to 
other pursuits. Nalder, Sr. was unable to obtain 
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financing upon his sole credit but obtained co-sign-
ers and participated in turkey raising upon a limited 
scale in 1952, 1953 and 1954. His success during 
these years was used by the trial court as the basis 
for determining the amount of damages awarded, 
not only to Nalder, Sr. but to Mrs. Nalder and 
Nalder, Jr., as well. This was error, as was the 
court's failure at any time to distinguish between 
Nalder, Sr., Nalder, Jr. and Mrs. Nalder upon 
any of the basic requirements for a cause of action 
based upon wrongful failure to release mort-
gages * * :-'" " 
None of the real estate mortgages involved in this 
case were executed by Nalder, Jr. (Ex. A 7, A 8, A 10) 
Although this court explicitly and unmistakably ruled 
that Nalder, Jr. could not recover for defendant's failure 
to release real estate mortgages, the jury was nevertheless 
permitted to consider this fact as a basis for awarding 
damages to Nalder, Jr. Because no attempt was made by 
the trial court in instructing the jury to differentiate 
between a failure to release real estate and chattel mort-
gages in determining the question of damages as applied 
to Nalder, Jr., it is submitted reversible error was com-
mitted. 
·The language of this court above quoted, recognizes 
the highly penal nature of Sec. 57-3-8, U.C.A. 1953 
upon which plaintiffs must base their right to a judg-
ment in favor of Nalder, Jr. The statute is explicit in 
its ter1ns in allowing damages only to mortgagor. Since 
Nalder, Jr. executed none of the real estate mortgages it 
must inevitably follow that he may claim no damages 
for defendant's failure to release them. Nor does it aid 
plaintiffs to contend that because the real estate mort-
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gages were given by Mrs. Nalder to secure the partner-
ship obligations of Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. the pen-
alty for wrongfully failing to release them must inure 
to the benefit of N alder, Jr. as one of the partners. 
Neither Nalder, Jr. nor the partnership were the mort-
gagors, hence, Nalder, Jr. does not come within the pro-
visions of this statute. 
This court also determined in the former appeal that 
Nalder, Jr. abandoned the turkey raising business in 1952. 
In an effort to escape from the effect of that decision 
and to justify a judgment on his behalf, the plaintiffs were 
permitted to testify that N alder, Jr kept an interest in 
the turkey business by actively participating in the limited 
turkey operations of Nalder, Sr. in 1952, 1953 and 1954, 
even to the extent of sharing in the profits and losses of 
Nalder, Sr. for those years. Defendant objected to this 
testimony on the ground that it was a repudiation of the 
testimony which plaintiffs had given at the former trial. 
(T r. 29 3) This situation was fully pointed out to the 
trial court, whose rulings appear at pages 201-202 of the 
transcript. The testimony at the former trial is found 
at pages 192-197 of the transcript. 
Furthermore, the uncontroverted testimony still is 
that in May of 1952 Nalder, Jr. com~enced working 
for the Grolier Society. (Tr. 306) In the spring of 
19 53 he was selling books in California and in June of 
1953 he began working full time for the Utah Sand and 
Gravel Company during all of the time which he would 
have devoted to raising turkeys. (Tr. 193) He continued 
on this job without interruption until the time of the 
former trial. (Tr. 194) Also, Nalder, Jr. made no at-
tempt whosoever to get any turkey financing after 1952. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
(Tr. 309) He made no joint application for financing 
with Nalder, Sr. disclosing any partnership with his 
father anytime after 1951. (Tr. 296) In the face of this 
testimony and against the decision of this court, it is sub-
mitted the trial court erred in permitting Nalder, Jr. to 
claim a continuation of the partnership after 1951. 
The trial court, aided by the insistence of plaintiffs' 
counsel, also permitted the jury to consider the pre-
tended success of Nalder, Sr. in 1952, 1953 and 1954 as 
the basis for assessing damages awarded to Nalder, Jr. 
This court, in the language above quoted, declared such 
action on the part of the trial court on the former trial, 
to be error. Since this same error was again committed 
a reversal of the judgment is required on the same 
ground. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
PERMITTING THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES 
TO H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND H. WILLIAM 
NALDER, JR. BECAUSE OF DEFENDANT'S AL-
LEGED FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO RELEASE REAL 
EST ATE MORTGAGES BECAUSE NO DEMAND 
OR REQUEST FOR SUCH RELEASES WAS EVER 
MADE AND FOR THE ADDITIONAL REASON 
THAT SAID PLAINTIFFS NEVER PAID OR 
OTHER WISE DISCHARGED THE OBLIGATIONS 
SECURED BY SAID MORTGAGES. 
In 56 A. L. R. at page 337 it is stated: 
u.A notice or request to the mortgagee that he 
enter a satisfaction or execute a release of the 
mortgage is a condition precedent to a right of 
action for the penalty." (Citing cases) 
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In the record now before the court there is no evidence 
that defendant was ever requested by the plaintiffs to 
release its real estate mortgages. In fact, no such de-
mand was ever made by plaintiffs. The cases are well 
settled on the prosition that such a demand must be made. 
See 56 A. L. R. 3 37 supra. See also International Har-
vester ·Co. v. Simpson, (Ala.) 13 3 So. 4, applying this 
rule to chattel mortgages. 
Statutes of the kind similar to 57-3-8, UCA, 1953, 
relied upon by plaintiffs, are highly penal in character and 
are to be strictly construed. The courts are practically 
unanimous in their reluctance to enforce such statutes 
until mortgagees have had every reasonable opportunity to 
comply with their provisions. This court has construed 
the Utah Statute in the case of Shibata v. Bear River 
State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P. 2d 251, and has held 
that the section is penal and must be strictly construed. 
A fact of. even greater significance, which the trial 
court totally ignored, is that the record shows that the 
real estate mortgage of April 1, 1950, (Ex. A-8) was 
never satisfied, hence plaintiffs at no time had a right to 
demand a release. In that mortgage, this provision was 
inserted: 
ccin addition to the foregoing amount of 
$6,721.8 0 this mortgage shall secure all other 
sums due and to become due from H. William 
Nalder, Sr. and Catherine Nalder, his wife, and 
H. William Nalder, Jr., and Mrs. H. William 
Nalder, Jr., his wife, in favor of Kellogg Sales 
Company.'' 
At the time that mortgage was executed, plaintiffs, 
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Nalder, Sr. and Jr., were indebted to defendant for the 
amounts recited in said mortgage. It should, therefore, 
be evident that by the express terms of the mortgage the 
plaintiffs could not require a release until all indebted-
ness owing to the defendant had been paid in full. Never, 
at any time, have the plaintiffs attempted to deny that 
they owed defendant amounts secured by this mortgage 
and the trial court so found. (R. 16) In addition, the 
1949 real estate mortgage (Ex. A 7) was never satisfied 
because the debt owing, which was secured in part by 
that mortgage, was never paid. Hence, the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to demand its release. It must, therefore, be 
apparent that the judgment awarded by the court for the 
failure to release real estate mortg~ges cannot stand, be-
cause the conditions which would have entitled the plain-
tiffs to the relief under the statute relied upon did not 
exist. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY 
PERMITTING THE JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES 
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE 
CHATTEL MORTGAGES: (a) BECAUSE NO DE-
MAND FOR RELEASE WAS MADE PRIOR TO 1954. 
(b) BECAUSE EACH CHATTEL MORTGAGE SE-
CURED THE PRIOR UNPAID DEBT OF PLAIN-
TIFFS, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND H. WIL-
LIAM NALDER, JR., HENCE, NO RELEASE COULD 
BE DEMANDED. (c) BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE THAT SAID PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT 
HAVE SECURED FINANCING IN 1954 AFTER THE 
RELEASE OF SAID CHATTEL MORTGAGES ON 
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MARCH 11, 1954. (d) BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 
CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF, H. 
WILLIAM NALDER, JR., ABANDONED THE RAIS-
ING OF TURKEYS IN 1952 AND NEVER EN-
GAGED IN THE TURKEY BUSINESS THERE-
AFTER. (e) BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS 
THAT PLAINTIFF, H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR., 
OBTAINED FINANCING IN 1953 AND 1954 ON 
ALL TURKEYS WHICH HE MADE ANY APPLICA-
TION FOR FINANCING. 
Section 9-1-4, UCA, 1953, provides: 
((After the full performance of the conditions 
of the mortgage any mortgagee, agent, assignee 
or legal representative who shall wilfully neglect, 
for the space of ten days after being requested, 
to discharge the same shall be liable to the mort-
gagor or his assigns in the sum of $50 punitive 
damages and also for all actual damages sustained 
by such neglect or refusal." 
The record in this connection shows that no de-
mand was ever made for the release of chattel mortgages 
until 1954. (Tr. 208) By the unequivocal terms of the 
statute which this court has said, in ruling upon the com-
panion statute requires strict construction there can be 
no penalty assessed for failure to release until after de-
mand. Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, supra. Not-
withstanding this fact, the jury was permitted to award 
Nalder, Sr. and Jr. a judgment for purported loss of 
profits sustained in 1952, and 1953, which losses, if sus-
tained at all, were suffered prior to any demand for a 
release having been made. It must be apparent, there-
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fore, that the judgment in this respect is fatally de-
fective. 
Releases of chattel mortgages were executed on the 
21st of January, 1954, and were recorded in the office 
of the clerk of Davis County, Utah, March 11, 1954. 
(Ex. A 4-6) It is submitted that there is no evidence 
that these plaintiffs sustained any damage for failure to 
release chattel mortgages between the time when the de-
mand was made and the time when the releases were 
placed of record. The releases were filed before the be-
ginning of the 1954 turkey season and there is no scin-
tilla of evidence by which it was shown that the chattel 
mortgages were not released in time for plaintiffs, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, to have secured financing 
for their 1954 operations. The record shows (Ex. I 1) 
that the plaintiffs' 1951 turkey poults were delivered 
April 3, May 4 and May 11, 1951, respectively, and Ex-
hibit E 1 shows that the turkeys raised in 1949 were 
not hatched until April 29, 1949, and Exhibit E 3 shows 
that the turkeys raised in 1950 were hatched May 1 
and May 7 respectively and Exhibit E 5 shows that those 
turkeys raised in 1951 were hatched March 9 and May 
10, respectively. 
The trial court permitted a judgment for Nalder, 
Sr. and Jr. for alleged damages sustained in 1952, 1953 
and 1954. Each of the chattel mortgages under con-
sideration contained this provision: 
uProvided that if the mortgagor shall pay or 
cause to be paid unto Kellogg Sales Company or 
its assigns the indebtedness above set forth on de-
mand as evidenced by his note or notes, together 
with interest as therein provided and shall further 
pay or cause to be paid subject to the further and 
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future indebtedness whether evidenced by promis-
sory note or not as the mortgagor may hereafter 
incur to the mortgagee, it being the intent h~ereof 
to secure the said mortgagee any advance or credit 
now made or hereafter made ::· ::· * or any other 
advancement or credit extended * * * " 
Thus, by the very terms of these chattel mortgages 
they were given to secure existing indebtedness no matter 
how originating. It is undisputed in the record that there 
was unpaid indebtedness going back to the inception of 
the business relationship between the parties. 
The law is well settled that taking a new chattel 
mortgage in the absence of intent does not satisfy a pre-
existing indebtedness. Pacific National Agricultural 
Credit Corp. v. Wilbur, Cal., 42 Pac. 2d 314: 
((The acceptance of the new note and mort-
gage as a renewal of the former note and mort-
gage, in the absence of evidence of any agreement 
that the new note and mortgage should be ac-
cepted in payment and satisfaction of the old, 
does not operate as an extinguishment or discharge 
of the latter." 
Mego1vn v. Fuller, Wyo. 266 Pac. 124, involved a 
whole series of chattel mortgages given over a period of 
many years. The Supreme Court of Wyoming held in 
that case that each new mortgage was a renewal or con-
tinuance of the previous one and was intended to secure 
the original debt which was never paid, even though the 
amount varied from time to time. Likewise see Loop 
Discount Corporation v. Holleb fS Co., (Ill.), 47 N. E. 
2d 337. 
It is the position of defendant that each new chat-
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tel mortgage taken by it included the past due and un-
paid debt of Nalder, Sr. and Jr., and that consequently 
no right to demand a release of any chattel mortgage ex-
isted, even assuming that a proper demand for release 
was made, until the debt secured by those mortgages was 
paid in full, including the amount still unpaid from the 
1949 operations of the mortgagors. Certainly, in view 
of the record, there never existed any right to a release 
of the 1949 chattel mortgage and we contend the same 
construction must be applied to the chattel mortgages 
given in 1950 and 1951 as well. Plaintiffs attempted to 
escape the consequence of their failure to pay the amount 
due under the 1949 chattel mortgage by contending that 
defendant promised in exchange for their agreement to 
execute the real estate mortgage of August 15, 1950, 
(Ex. A-10) that the 1949 chattel mortgage would be 
released. Defendant denied any such agreement and we 
shall discuss under another heading of this brief why 
plaintiffs' contention is untenable. 
The record conclusively demonstrates that Nalder, 
Jr. abandoned the business of raising turkeys in 1952. 
The record shows that he went to other pursuits in that 
year and never returned to turkey raising. He made no 
efforts after 1952 to get financing, either individually or 
jointly, with H. William Nalder, Sr. He also abandoned 
the ranch which he had leased for the purpose of raising 
turkeys and either sold or returned to his seller the equip-
ment which he claims he was going to use in such opera-
tions in 1953 and 1954. (Tr. 306-309, 192-197) This 
being so it must necessarily be concluded that Nalder, 
Jr. vol un taril y made it impossible for himself to raise 
the 14,000 turkeys which he states he intended to or 
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could have raised in those years. Since the verdict and 
judgment in this case permitted a recovery for him for 
1952, 1953 and 1954 lost profits, it necessarily follows 
that there is no evidence which can or does support this 
judgment and for this reason the case requires a reversal. 
Similarly, Nalder, Sr. was awarded a judgment upon 
the theory that he too suffered damage in 1953 and 1954 
because he and his son were prevented from raising 14,000 
turkeys. Inasmuch as the facilities necessary to raise that 
,.,ere 
number of turkeys w;a.s voluntarily surrendered by N alder, 
Jr. in 1952, it likewise follows it could not have been 
and was not the intention of either Nalder, Sr. or Nalder, 
Jr. to raise the claimed number of turkeys as represented. 
The record further shows that no application made in 
those years by Nalder, Sr. requested financing for more 
than 2,000 turkeys. (Ex. G 3) (T r. 15 6, 2 04) He and 
Rasmussen testified that his unsuccessful efforts to obtain 
financing for 5,000 turkeys on his 1952 application had 
discouraged him and led to reduced applications in 
1953 and 1954. (Tr. 207, 265) Nevetheless, with the 
aid of Rasmussen, his feed dealer, he actually obtained 
all the financing in those years which he made any at-
tempt to get. (Tr. 264, 265, 271, 272) Nalder, Sr. claims 
he did not know why his applications were being re-
jected and certainly he did not at the time they were 
made and rejected, attribute the rejection to defendant's 
unreleased mortgages. In this state of the record it is 
apparent that no attempt was made by either Nalder, 
Sr. or Nalder, Jr. to raise 14,000 turkeys in 1953 or 1954, 
hence, no claim to damages can possibly be predicated 
upon the assertion that in those years plaintiffs would 
have raised that number of turkeys. The record shows 
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a complete abandonment of the business by Nalder, Jr. 
and a voluntary reduction in the applications made by 
N alder, Sr. for financing. In either case the judgment is 
entirely unsupported by any competent evidence sus-
taining the extent of the damage claimed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
APPLYING AN IMPROPER RULE OF DAMAGES 
TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF LOSS OF ANTICI-
PATED PROFITS FOR THE YEARS 1952, 1953 AND 
1954. 
In order to sustain a judgment in their favor the 
plaintiffs were required to show that as a result of de-
fendant's wrongful conduct they sustained damage. Loss 
of profits like any other damage must be proven before 
any recovery may be had for such a loss. The same rules 
of certainty and definiteness apply to a claim of lost 
profits as apply to any other type of damage. Also, con-
jecture, speculation and guessing are as objectionable in 
proving such losses as they would be in any claim for 
damages. 
It is conceded that loss of future or anticipated 
profits is recoverable in a proper action. The following 
authorities support this proposition: 
States v. Durkin, (Kan.) 68 Pac. 1091 
Schultz v. Wells Butchers' Supply, (Wash.) 275 
Pac. 737 
Outcault Advertising Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank 
of Emporia, (Kan.) 234 Pac. 988 
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However, the rules do not permit a claimant to re-
cover. such a loss by merely claiming that except for the 
interference of defendant profits would have been so 
much money. A claimant must establish a basis for his 
claim in order to recover. The requirement is that of 
proof with reasonable certainty. 
Claims for loss of anticipated or future profits by 
their very nature are speculative and uncertain. The gen-
eral rule applicable to damages is that in order to be re-
coverable they must be certain. See Restatement of the 
Law of Torts, Section 912; Steiner v. Long Beach Local 
No. 128, (Cal.) 123 Pac. 2d. 20; Grupe v. Glick, (Cal.) 
160 Pac. 2d 832. In the latter case the following state-
ment was made: 
uAn award of damages for the detriment oc-
casioned by the loss of future profits is subject to 
the general rule that the amount which, except 
for the defendant's wrongful act, would have 
come to the plaintiff, must be certain and must 
have been within the contemplation of the parties 
when they contracted." 
See also Blakely Printing Co. v. Fort Dearborn Mercantile 
Co., (Ill.) 53 N.E. 2d 55 and Krikorian v. Dailey, (Va.) 
197 S.E. 442 at page 448: 
((Profits may only be recovered where they can 
be ascertained with reasonable certainty." 
The rule applying to such cases, as the above au-
thorities clearly demonstate, is that any loss of future 
profits must be related to the experience of the claimant 
prior to the time of the commission of the wrongful act. 
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The Restatement of Torts, Section 912, page 578 states 
the rule as follows: 
uAs a condition to recovery for loss of earn-
ings, the person harmed must offer evidence, con-
vincing to the trier of the fact, that a substantial 
amount of earnings has been lost. To do this he 
must introduce evidence of the amount of earn-
ings received Prior to the time of the injury, or 
the amount which he was capable of obtaining, 
and at least some evidence having a tendency to 
show that he could have earned something during 
the period in which loss of earnings is claimed." 
A leading case on this subject is Williams v. Island 
City Mercantile fS Milling Company, (Ore.) 37 Pac. 49. 
That case involved a claim for loss of future profits grow-
ing out of breach of contract. Among other things, the 
court says the following: 
uw e are of the opinion, therefore, that the 
true measure of damages for the failure to com-
plete the contract within the time stipulated, and 
for the loss of time occasioned by the attempts of 
plaintiffs, after September 20th, to comply with 
the terms of their contract, is the reasonable value 
of the use of the mill during such time, as ascer-
tained from the past experience of the defendant 
* * * " 
uThe ruling announced by the court as the 
measure of damages is the difference between the 
actual and guaranteed capacity of the mill was, 
we think, correct because it was based upon past 
transactions; * * * " 
See also: 
Chain Belt Co. v. U. S., 115 Fed. Supp. 701 
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William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters 
of the United States, 42 Fed. 2d 152 
Shell Oil Co. v. State Tire & Oil Co., 126 Fed. 
2d 971 
This court in the case of Jenkins v. Morgan, (Ut.) 
260 Pac. 2d 532 at page 535 quotes with approval the 
case of Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Products Co., 
122 Wash. 220, 210 Pac. 366, 367, as follows: 
cc ::· ::· ::· before special damages for loss of 
profits to a general business occasioned by the 
wrongful acts of another may be recovered, it 
must be made to appear that the business had been 
in successful operation for such a period of time 
as to give it permanency and recognition, and that 
such business was earning a profit which could be 
reasonably ascertained and approximated." 
In U. S. v. Griffith, Gornall fS Carman, Inc., (lOth 
Circuit), 210 Fed. 2d 11, it was said: 
uThe loss of future profits from a regularly 
established business may in proper cases be estab-
lished by showing that the profits after the wrong 
are less than past profits. 25 C. J. S. Damages, 
Sec. 90 (citing other cases) * ~· ~- ." 
The evidence is undisputed that in the years prior 
to 1952, when there was no interference from the defend-
ant and when in fact the defendant was financing the 
plaintiffs to the full extent of their operations, their busi-
ness was a failure. We quote from the plaintiffs' own 
statements regarding their business operations. On No-
vember 21, 1951, they wrote defendant as follows: 
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u ~.. * * It surely looks bad for us again * * * 
You also know without me telling you, that we 
have made nothing since we went into the turkeys 
* * * . 
uif we had sold them here when processed we 
would have been able to pay Kellogg all we owed 
him and had $800.00 over, but as it was we went 
$6,000.00 in the hole. * * * 
uThe next year (last year) we were able to 
pay Kellogg Company all of last year's bill and 
$1,000.00 on interest. 
uMr. Williams, this year the way we had to 
feed was also a very costly lesson to us. Our feed 
bill this year will be more than $6,000.00 above 
what it was last year ::· * ::- ." (Ex. D 4) 
Again on April 5, 1952, they wrote the defendant as 
follows: 
u * * ~· You may say rightly that they have 
not been good years * * * " (Ex. D 9) 
In those three years plaintiffs were unable to pay off 
the 1949 debt owing to defendant. Did they show as 
this court in Jenkins v. Morgan, supra, states they must 
show ((that the business had been in successful operation 
for such a period of time as to give it permanency and 
recognition, and that such business was earning a profit 
which could be reasonably ascertained and approxi-
mated?" The record shows exactly the opposite. The 
turkey raising business, to para phrase the case of W il-
liams v. Islaud City Mercalltile f5 Milling Co., supra, is 
even more speculative than the milling business and to 
permit these plaintiffs to come into court and testify 
that in 1952, 1953 and 1954 they would have raised 
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14,000 turkeys and marketed the same at so much profit 
per bird was the purest kind of speculation and was in 
no way related to their past experience of earnings or the 
extent of their past operations. It is consequently sub-
mitted that the judgment rendered cannot stand or be 
sustained and that the same should be reversed. 
Furthermore, the rule is there can be no damages 
recovered for anticipated or future profits to be derived 
from a business only in contemplation in the owner's 
mind or which is unestablished. In Jenkins v. Morgan, 
supra, this court stated: 
c:c:All the authorities are unanimous in holding 
that prospective profits to be derived from a busi-
ness which is not yet established but one merely 
in contemplation are generally too uncertain and 
speculative to form a basis for recovery." 
See also: 
Chain Belt Co. v. United States, supra 
Grupe v. Glick, supra 
Krigorian v. Dailey, supra 
Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128, supra 
15 Am. Juris. page 573, Sec. 157 
25 Corpus Juris Secundum, P. 518, Sec. 42 (b) 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. So. Photo Material Co., 
295 Fed. 98 
Ellerson v. Grove, Circuit Court of Appeals, 4th 
Circuit, 44 Fed. 2d 49 3 
Andreopulos v. Peresteredes, (Wash.) 163 Pac. 770 
Goebel v. Hough, 2 N.W. 847, (Minn.) 
Blankenship v. Lanier, (Ala.) 1 0 1 So. 7 6 3 
Central Coal Co. v. Hartman, Ill Fed. 9 6 
Whitehead v. Cape Henry Syn. (Vir.) 68 S.E. 263 
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Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Red Iron Drilling 
Co., Inc. (La.) 192 So. 895 
Mensing v. Wright, (Kan.) 119 Pac. 374 
Landon v. Hill, 29 Pac. 2d 281, (Cal.) 
It is submitted that from the evidence in this record 
there was no established business damaged by the acts 
of defendant, even admitting for the purpose of argu-
ment only, that they were wrongful. Consequently, 
there can be no damages awarded in favor of the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs testified that in 1952 they had capacity 
to hold and care for 14,000 turkeys and that they would 
have raised that many birds if financing had been avail-
able. They asserted they would have duplicated the same 
number in 1953 and 1954 and the proof was that in 
1952, 1953 and 1954 they never raised in any year more 
than 2,000 turkeys. We have already pointed out that 
Young Nalder in 1952 completely abandoned turkey 
raising as a business and that Nalder, Sr. in 1953 and 1954 
curtailed his applications for credit and we have already 
made the observation also that in no year had they ever 
raised more than 6,000 turkeys. We submit that the jury 
was permitted to speculate upon the theory contended 
for by the plaintiffs and that even the speculation upon 
which the jury was permitted to act had no basis or 
foundation in fact. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE PLAINTIFFS' EX-
HIBITS 1-1, I-2, Q, RAND N 1-4 FOR THE REASON 
THAT SAID EXHIBITS WERE INCOMPETENT, 
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IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL AND NO 
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR THEIR 
ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE. 
Under the next preceeding argument of this brief 
we have stated our reasons for asserting that the court 
erred in awarding damages to plaintiffs for loss of antici-
pated or future profits because there was no relationship 
between the damages a warded and the plain tiffs' ex peri-
ence in the turkey_ business prior to the alleged interfer-
ence by defendant. We now wish to make comment 
upon the exhibits which the court received over the ob-
jection of defendant upon which a determination of 
damages was made. 
Exhibits I-1 and I-2 were taken from the books and 
records of Lee Brown Processing Company. They were 
admitted upon the testimony of Keith McMurdie who 
identified himself as plant manager and field man for 
the Brown Company. At page 3 5 of the transcript ap-
pears the following testimony: 
Q. I show you what has been marked as Ex-
hibit I-1 and ask you if you can tell me 
just what it is? Don't give me any infor-
mation from it. Just what is that? 
A. This is our - this must be a photostatic 
copy of our ledger sheet. Out of our rec-
ords. 
Q. Is there any question about it being a ledger 
sheet? Some question about a photostat, 
but,-
A. This is a duplicate, I suppose, of our ledger 
sheet. 
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The same kind of testimony marked the foundation laid 
for the admission of Exhibit I-2. (Tr. 37) There was no 
testimony that these exhibits were the records of the 
Brown company kept under the supervision and control 
of the witness or that they were true or correct or that the 
witness knew them to be true and correct. Furthermore, 
they were not the original books of account but were 
copies. This hearsay evidence was admitted by the court 
over the well-founded objections of the defendant. (Tr. 
36, 328) 
Exhibits Q and R also purported to be documents 
taken from the :files of the Lee Brown Processing Com-
pany and they were not identified by any witness from 
the Brown company as being correct or as kept under 
his supervision and control or that the witness knew them 
to be correct. Exhibits Q and R, on the other hand, were 
admitted on the testimony of Nalder, Sr. who merely 
stated that they had been received by him in connection 
with a settlement which he had with the Lee Brown 
Company. Both Q and R were the rankest of hearsay not 
even possessing the inadequate qualifications of Exhibits 
I-1 and I-2. (Tr. 326, 327) 
Based upon Exhibits 1-1, 1-2, Q and R, the court 
admitted in evidence plaintiffs' Exhibit N 1-4 which con-
situted the computations of the alleged profits which the 
plaintiffs contend they would have made based upon 
14,000 turkeys in 1952, 1953 and 1954. There having 
been no foundation laid to receive any of the exhibits, 
which were all hearsay, the evidence of lost profits, even 
if otherwise acceptable, was inadmissible and the judg-
ment based upon these computations and exhibits must 
necessarily be erroneous. (Tr. 330, 331, 334) 
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Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 1, Sees. 48, 59, 
pages 789, 794 
Nichols Applied Evidence (1934 Supp.) Sees. 48, 
53, pages 1 0 3, 1 04 
Meredith, et al v. Bitter Root Valley Irrig. Co. 
(Mont.) 141 Pac. 643, page 648 
Ogden Packing and Provision Co. v. Tooele Meat 
and Storage Company, 41 Ut. 92, 124 Pac. 
333 
Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 96 
Ut. 331, 85 Pac. 2d 819 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT'S FAILURE OR 
REFUSAL TO RELEASE EITHER REAL ESTATE OR 
CHATTEL MORTGAGES WAS THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF ANY LOSS TO PLAINTIFFS, H. WIL-
LIAM NALDER, SR. OR H. WILLIAM NALDER, JR. 
The judgment in this case rests upon the unsupported 
conclusion of plaintiffs that the reason for their inability 
to obtain turkey :financing for 1952, 1953 and 1954 was 
that the record in the county recorder's office in Davis 
County, Utah, showed the real estate and chattel mort-
gages, pleaded in plaintiff's complaint, unsatisfied and un-
released. Plaintiffs asserted their complete ignorance of 
the condition of this record until notified by Rasmussen 
in 1954. (Tr. 208-213) The record does not support 
plaintiffs in this claim of ignorance. They were notified 
in wrtttng by defendant that the mortgages were not 
released in 1950. (Ex. C-1 0) Furthermore, the plain-
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tiffs carried on correspondence with defendant in 1952 
and 19 53 requesting subordination of defendant's debt. 
(Exs. D13, 14, 16-23) (Tr. 244-257) They could hardly 
be ignorant of the fact that the requirement of a subordi-
nation agreement by General Mills Company was for the 
purpose of clearing the record of these mortgages and 
to constitute the General Mills obligation a :first lien. In 
a memorandum dated December, 1951, reference is made 
to unreleased chattel mortgages which would have to be 
released or subordinated. (Ex. F 4) Presumably this sub-
ject was discussed with Nalder, Jr. for he made several 
attempts to get defendant to give him such a subordina-
tion. (Ex. D 17, 19) (Tr. 154, 155, 301, 302, 323) See 
also Exhibit F 8. Furthermore, plaintiffs well understood 
the purpose of a subordination agreement. They re-
quested defendant in 1950 to subordinate defendant's debt 
to the :first mortgage on their home, which request de-
fendant granted. (Tr. 56-57) This pretended lack of 
knowledge by plaintiffs is unconvincing and not very sig-
nificant except that it gives a good insight into plaintiffs' 
willingness to slant testimony to their own advantage. 
The important question pertains to the actual reasons 
why plaintiffs' applications for financing were denied and 
the equally important question as to whether the evidence 
shows that defendant's conduct was the proximate cause 
of plaintiffs' inability to get financing. 
The burden of proving damage from defendant's 
failure to release mortgages was always upon the plaintiffs. 
Defendant contends that the proof submitted does not 
sustain this burden and that the verdict and judgment 
entered must be reversed. 
Plaintiffs' counsel, contrary to the theory upon which 
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he t:i~\is case that defendant's failure to release mort-
gages was the sole cause of plaintiffs' alleged damages, 
requested that the jury be instructed that more than one 
proximate cause may exist in an action for damages and 
that the defendant's acts did not need to constitute the 
sole proximate cause in order for plaintiffs to recover, 
and that concurrent acts of two wrongdoers combining 
to cause injury do not excuse a defendant from liability. 
The court, included these requests in the charge to the 
jury as instructions No. 16 and 18. These instructions 
were grossly erroneous because insrtuction No. 18 as-
sumed, without any proof, that a wrong had been com-
mitted by some third party in refusing to accept plain-
tiffs' credit applications. Instructions No. 16 miscon-
ceived the burden of proof resting upon the plain tiffs. 
N alder, Jr. testified that he made an application to 
the Pillsbury Company and Farmers Grain of Ogden. 
These applications were denied and there is no pretense 
of any proof as to the reasons why they were denied, or 
that the defendant's unreleased mortgages caused their 
rejection. (Tr. 305, 322, 323) Nalder, Sr. also stated that 
he had tried to get the Pillsbury Company to approve an 
application but he had not the remotest idea of why his 
request to that company for credit was not accepted. 
In 19 52 N alder, Jr. made an application to General 
Mills for financing for 5,000 turkeys. (Ex. F-1) The ap-
plication was never approved and no reason was ever 
given by General Mills for its rejection. There is noth-
ing in the record which sustains the claim that this re-
fusal was because of defendant's unreleased mortgages. 
It is not disputed that one of the requirements made by 
General Mills was for a release or subordination of the 
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debt owing to defendant. (Ex. F 8) It is also a fact that 
defendant never executed such a release· or subordination. 
That it offered repeatedly to do so is established beyond 
question. (Tr. 152, 299, 324, 325) (Ex. D 14, 16-23) 
Defendant did make its offer conditional upon payment 
of $352.00 which represented a sum which Nalder had 
received as a credit for delivery of mortgaged turkeys to 
a service station operator. Nalder, Jr. recognized that 
this condition was reasonable and attempted to comply 
with it. (Tr. 154, 155, 301, 302, 323, 325) (Ex. 
D 17, 19) 
Plaintiffs would have the court accept these facts as 
proof that the unreleased mortgages were the cause of 
General Mills' refusing to finance Nalder, Jr. in 1952. 
These facts, however, fall far short of proving proximate 
cause. In the first place, the General Mills credit repre-
sentative who appeared at the trial and testified for plain-
tiffs refused to testify that this application would have 
received favorable consideration even if defendant had 
either subordinated or released its mortgages. (Tr. 128) 
On the contrary, he testified that many factors concern-
ing Nalder and his credit and business reputation were 
under investigation and that other indispensable condi-
tions imposed by his company were never complied with. 
For inst;nce, N alder, Jr. was to be strictly limited to 
5,000 turkeys, not 9,000 or 14,000. (Tr. 115, 121) He 
was to secure his application by a guarantee which was 
never obtained and without which the application would 
not have been approved. (Tr. 115, 116, 126, 127, 133) 
The credit reputation of Nalder, Jr. was under serious 
question. (Ex. F 6) (Tr. 111, 122) He presented a poor 
paying record and was involved in litigation and had 
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numerous mortgages and debts of record in considerable 
amounts in addition to the mortgages in the name of 
defendant as mortgagee. (Tr. 117, 122-124) It could be 
argued that this application ccdied on the vine" because 
Nalder, Jr. never got the subordination or the guarantee, 
but there is no justification in the record for assuming or 
inferring that even if he had obtained these documents, 
the application would have been approved. It is certain 
that nothing in the record justified the trial court in per-
mitting the jury to speculate that Nalder, Jr's. applica-
tion failed because of defendant's unreleased mortgages. 
A fair inference from the evidence in this record leads 
irresistibly to the conclusion that the application would 
never have been approved. The testimony of Nalder, Jr., 
himself, shows that his credit was so bad that he could 
not even borrow $352.00 with which he could have had 
a subordination from defendant. (Tr. 302, 324) 
Nalder, Sr. made applications to Ralston Purina 
Company in 1952, 1953 and 1954. All that the record 
shows concerning the 1953 application was that it was 
for 1,300 to 1,500 turkeys (Tr. 156, 204) and that it 
was not approved. 
In 1952 the application of Nalder, Sr. was for credit 
for 5,000 turkeys. (Ex. G 2) It, too, was rejected. In 
1954, the application was for 2,000 turkeys. (Ex. G 3) 
Both the latter applications were not accepted. 
The record is clear that all applications made by 
Nalder, Sr. were turned down for much the same reasons 
that Nalder, Jr's. application to General Mills was denied. 
His credit rating was poor, (Ex. L 11, 13, 14) (Tr. 96, 
478-82, 499, 508, 509), he lacked the character and repu-
tation which Ralston Purina thought one of their credit 
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risks should possess, (Ex. L 15), there were numerous 
mortgages and judgments in favor of other creditors 
' in addition to defendant's mortgages, which were of 
record (Tr. 492, 493). Other factors played their part in 
these rejections. (Tr. 499, 510, 511) 
The Ralston Purma credit manager testified posi-
tively that it was not defendant's unreleased mortgages 
which were responsible for a denial of Nalder, Sr.'s credit 
applications. (Tr. 497, 500) Of course, it was conceded 
that a release or subordination of defendant's mortgages 
would have been necessary to the approval of an applica-
tion. But here again the record in no sense justifies the 
conclusion that defendant's unreleased mortgages were 
the cause or the reason why Nalder, Sr.'s applications 
were turned down, or that if they had been released the 
applications would have been approved. 
The burden of proof, resting as it did upon the 
plaintiffs, required them to prove by competent evidence 
that any application which was made by either Nalder, 
Sr. or Nalder, Jr. would have been granted if defendant 
had released or subordinated its mortgages, and that solely 
because those mortgages were not released, the plaintiffs 
were unable to get credit. We submit it was not enough 
for plaintiffs to prove that the failure of the defendant 
to release combined with other reasons, as in a case in-
volving the concurrent acts of joint tort feasors. 
The contentions of the defendant in this regard are 
well grounded in the authorities. In the case of Ebbert v. 
First National Bank of Condon, (Ore.) 279 Pac. 534, a 
case closely analogous to this case, the plaintiff was like-
wise claiming damages because of the alleged wrongful 
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refusal of the defendant bank to release some chattel 
mortgages. The court makes these observations: 
((The recovery of the item of $37,808.08 was 
ventured upon the contention._that the defendant 
wrongfully and purposely failed to satisfy the 
mortgage records and thereby caused the Oregon-
Washington Joint Stock Land Bank of Portland 
to reject his application for a mortgage loan in the 
sum of $25,000.00 Before that incident could be-
come an element of damages, it was necessary that 
the evidence should show (a) that in the absence 
of the wrongful act there was a reasonable likeli-
hood that the loan would have been made, and 
(b) that the defendant's neglect caused the rejec-
tion of the application." 
In that case many of the factors were present that 
are present in this case. For instance, in that case there 
was a whole series of chattel mortgages which the plain-
tiff had not mentioned, including unpaid taxes. After 
considering all of the elements the court stated: 
H ~· * :-'" Such a remote possibility of injury is 
too uncertain to be recoverable as damages. Suth-
erland on Damages (4th Ed.) 53 ; Sedgwick on 
Damages (8th Ed.) Sec. 170. The following apt 
language of Mr. Justice McBride in Spain v~ 
Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 78 Or. 355, 
153 P. 470, 475, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 1104, is ap-
plicable: (When the evidence leaves the case in 
such a situation that the jury will be required to 
speculate and guess which of several possible causes 
occasioned the injury, that part of the case should 
be withdrawn from their consideration.'" 
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See also Shealy's Inc. v. So. Bell Tel. 5 Tel. Co., 126 Fed. 
Supp. 382. 
In United States v. Huff, 175 Fed. 2d. 678, the 
plaintiff claimed damages for lost sheep and goats because 
of destroyed fences. The court in that case said: 
ult therefore becomes patent that the evidence 
as to the loss of these -animals in each case fails to 
rise above mere speculation and guess. 
uwhile it may be inviting to approve the trial 
court's :findings and allow at least a partial recov-
ery for such losses, it remains our solemn duty 
under this evidence to disallow these unproved 
claims, as it is well settled that speculative damages 
are not recoverable. It was incumbent upon these 
plaintffs to adduce some clear and convincing 
proof of specific losses resulting solely from the 
Government's failure to repair and maintain the 
fences and this they have signally failed to do." 
See also: 
Addison-Miller, Inc. v. U. S., 70 Fed. Supp. 893 
William H. Schwanke, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., (Wis.) 
227 N. W. 30 
Tribune Co. v. Bradshaw, (Ill.), 20 Ill. App. 17 
Stevens v. Yale, (Mich.) 72 N. W. 5 
Winston Cigarette Machine Co. v. Wells-White-
head Tobacco Co., (N.C.) 53 S. E. 885 
Murray v. Texas Co., (S.C.) 174 S. E. 231 
Harmon v. Western Union Tel. Co., (S. C.) 43 
S. E. 959 
This court has spoken unmistakably in cases similar 
to this one in which several causes or explanations of an 
injury are involved, only one of which may be attributed 
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to the wrong or negligence of the defendant, and has held 
that in such cases it must be shown that the loss or damage 
claimed would not have occurred if the particular wrong 
attributed to the defendant had not been committed. 
Jenson v. S. H. Kress f5 Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 
Pac. 2d 958 
Tremelling v. So. Pac. Co., 257 Pac. 1066, 70 
Utah 72 
Virend v. Utah Ore-Sampling Co., 48 Utah 398, 
160 Pac. 115 
Quinn v. Utah Gas and Coke Co., 42 Utah 113, 
129 Pac. 362 
Inasmuch as there were numerous factors involved 
in this case which just as effectively could have prevented, 
and, we think did prevent, these plaintiffs from securing 
their :financing in 1952, 1953 and 1954 as the existence of 
defendant's recorded mortgages, there was no proof of 
proximate cause. The evidence in the record fails to elim-
inate all factors which existed as possible reasons for the 
rejection of the applications, except the alleged wrong 
of the defendant. It is submitted that in this case there 
is no showing of proximate cause and that the judgment 
rendered by the court rests upon speculation and guess 
and cannot be permitted to stand. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUS-
IVELY ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT ACTED 
IN GOOD FAITH. 
Evidence supporting the above proposition is found 
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in the testimony of witnesses Quinney, Williams and Aust. 
(Tr. 336, 337,357,377,432,433,434,444,448,449,462) 
There is nothing in the record contradicting this testi-
mony. This being the only evidence on the question of 
good faith, the jury should have been directed that the 
good faith of the defendant was established. The verdict 
and judgment, contrary to this testimony, is against the 
evidence and hence is reversible error. 
This court in Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, supra, 
denied recovery in a case where damages were claimed 
because a mortgagee did not release a mortgage. In that 
case the record showed that in refusing to release the 
mortgage the mortgagee was acting on the advice of its 
attorney. This court, referring to Section 57-3-8, UCA 
1953, says the following: 
uThe above statute is penal in nature and 
should be strictly construed. It is not meant to 
penalize one who honestly, though mistakenly, re-
fuses to release or discharge a mortgage of record 
because he believes that there has been no full 
satisfaction. Under the facts and circumstances 
of this case where the bank, relying upon the ad-
vice of an attorney, honestly thinking that it had 
valid and subsisting mortgages against the appel-
lant which had not been satisfied, refused to 
release the mortgages, it was acting in good faith 
and was, therefore, not liable for damages under 
the above section." 
There is proof in the record from which it conclusively 
appears that defendant was relying on the advice of its 
counsel. It must be presumed in the absence of contrary 
evidence that defendant acted in good faith when it was 
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following a policy with regard to releasing mortgages 
laid down by its counsel as a business procedure to pro-
tect the best interests of the defendant. The policy was, 
to retain all mortgages as long as there was unpaid in-
debtedness owing to the defendant. 
To overcome the overwhelming effect of· the testi-
mony of defendant's witnesses concerning its policy and 
the advice given it by counsel relating to releasing mort-
gages, plaintiffs attempted to show oppressive conduct 
on the part of the defendant in requiring excessive secur-
ity and the alleged threats attributed to the witness Wil-
liams that the defendant would prevent the plaintiffs 
from obtaining any further credit. They further assert 
that defendant's demand for the payment of $352.00 to 
be applied upon a debt of over $5,000.00 as a condition to 
giving a subordination agreement is evidence that de-
fendant was acting in bad faith. We have already suffi-
ciently answered the :first two contentions by showing 
indisputable evidence that there was no duplicate :financing 
and that the threats claimed were nothing but the figment 
of the plaintiffs' imagination. We shall give what we be-
believe to be a complete answer to the final contention 
hereafter. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OVER DE-
FENDANT'S OBJECTION THAT SCOVILLE AND 
SCHINKER PROMISED OR AGREED ON BEHALF 
OF DEFENDANT TO RELEASE MORTGAGES 
WITH NO PRELIMINARY SHOWING OF AGENCY 
OR AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH PROMISE AND 
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FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT UNCON-
TROVERTED TESTIMOMY ESTABLISHES THAT 
SCOVILLE AND SCHINKER HAD NO SUCH 
AUTHORITY. 
The court permitted the plaintiffs to testify to 
promises or agreements supposedly made by one Scoville 
and Schinker relating to the release of the 1949 chattel 
mortgage and to defendant's agreement to accept the 
real estate mortgage of August 15, 1950, as payment of 
all prior mortgages and other alleged representations re-
lating to the release of the 1950 chattel mortgage. The 
plaintiffs' contentions in this regard are found in the 
transcript at pages 42, 60-62, 214-216 and 318. There 
is nothing in the record showing that either Scoville or 
Schinker had authority to make the promises or repre-
sentations attributed to them with respect to these mat-
ters. Williams, defendant's general manager, specifically 
testified that these individuals had no such authority. 
(Tr. 44-54, 314, 315, 338, 339, 342) The correctness of 
Williams' testimony is corroborated by Exhibits C 9 and 
C 10. By Exhibit C 10 the plaintiffs were informed 
directly by defendant that no release of mortgage would 
be obtained without authority from Mr. Williams and 
Exhibits C 4, 5, 6, 7. 5 and 8 all show that Scoville in 
securing the signature on the real estate mortgage of 
August 15, 1950, (Ex. A 10) was acting solely as a mes-
senger. 
This court has many times passed upon the question 
of the proof required to establish agency to bind a prin-
ciple. In Witherow l-'. Mystic Toilers, 42 Utah 360, 130 
Pac. 58, this court says: 
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((Of course agency cannot be shown by dec-
larations of the agent. And, before declarations 
of the agent may be received as admissions against 
his principal, the agency and the authority of the 
agent must first be shown. Here neither was shown. 
Nor is it true, as the court seems to indicate in the 
charge, that declarations of an agent, to show 
agency, go merely to the question of sufficiency 
of the evidence to show such relation, and hence 
may be considered for such purpose, in connection 
with other evidence. The authorities, we think, are 
to the effect that such evidence is incompetent 
for such purpose, and that the fact of agency 
must be established by evidence dehors the dec-
larations of the agent." 
In Jenson v. S. H. Kress fS Co., supra, plaintiff was 
permitted to testify to a hearsay statement of a former 
employee of the defendant without a showing that the 
statement made was binding on the defendant because 
made in the course of employment or under authority. 
It was held that the statement testified to by plaintiff 
was hearsay and was not binding upon the defendant. 
See Booth v. Nelson, 61 Utah 239, 211 Pac. 985, and 20 
Am. Jr. P. 508, Sec. 598, and Cole v. Myers (Conn.) 
21 Atl. 2d 396. 
It is submitted that all of the evidence in this case 
relating to the alleged promises or agreements asserted to 
have been made by Scoville and Schinker relating to re-
leasing chattel mortgages or to accepting the real estate 
mortgage (Ex. A 10) in satisfaction of the 1949 real 
estate and chattel mortgages was inadmissible without the 
preliminary showing that such promises or representa-
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tions were made with defendant's authority, and de-
fendant's exception should have been allowed. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT , 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT 
AND FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
At the proper time in the trial proceedings defen-
dant made its motion for a directed verdict. (Tr. 514) 
At that time the trial court expressed doubt that plain-
tiffs had proved causll connection between the acts of 
defendant and the alleged loss or damage claimed or that 
there was adequate proof of damage. (Tr. 516) How-
ever, this motion was denied after judgment was entered 
on the verdict, as were defendant's motions for judgment 
notwithstanding verdict or for a new trial. By its .re-
quested instructions B and C defendant also asked the 
court to direct a verdict against the plaintiffs, Nalder, Sr. 
and Nalder, Jr. All of these motions were denied. 
The basis for the motion for directed verdict is that 
there is no com pet en t or sufficient evidence in this record 
to sustain a finding that defendant, in failing to release 
its mortgages, destroyed the credit of plaintiffs; that 
defendant had a right to maintain all of its mortgages 
of record; that there is no proof that failure to release 
mortgages was the proximate cause of damage to plain-
tiffs; that at all times complained of defendant was will-
ing and offered to subordinate its mortgages to any con-
cern willing to advance credit to plaintiffs; that the 
defendant was within its rights in demanding an ac-
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counting of $3 52.00 for turkeys illegally sold by plain-
tiff, Nalder, Jr., in violation of the terms of the defen-
dant's 1951 chattel mortgage, as a condition to delivering 
such a subordination agreement; that no proper demand 
was made upon defendant for a release; that the evidence 
is conclusive that defendant acted in good faith in not re-
leasing its mortgages which is a complete defense to plain-
tiffs' action, and there is no competent evidence of bad 
faith; that there is no competent evidence of any dam-
age having been sustained by plaintiffs and the evidence 
on damages is speculative, uncertain, incompetent, ir-
relevant and immaterial and was admitted without proper 
foundation. 
All of the matters have been fully argued under 
the preceding points of this brief and no useful purpose 
can be served in their repetition. 
It is submitted that the motions made and each of 
them should have been granted and the denial thereof 
was error. 
POINT X 
THE COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN OF ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AND IN ITS RE-
FUSAL TO GIVE CERTAIN OF DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
It is the contention of defendant that fundamental 
and prejudicial error was committed by the trial court 
in his instructions to the jury. Exceptions were taken to 
specific instructions complained of. (Tr. 536-539) 
By instruction No. 4 the jury was permitted to de-
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termine whether Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. were part-
ners in 1952, 1953 and 1954 and if they so found to 
assess a single verdict in favor of both plaintiffs. This in-
struction ignored completely the determination by this 
court on the former appeal that Nalder, Jr. quit the tur-
key business in 1952 and turned to other pursuits. This 
court also decided that N alder, Jr. could recover no 
damages after he left the business of raising turkeys. We 
have fully set out defendant's views with respect to this 
subject under Point I hereof and rely upon the argu-
ments therein set out. 
Instruction No. 7 concerned itself with the elements 
of damage which the jury was instructed might be con-
sidered in the event the issues were found in plaintiffs' 
favor. All the elements of damage referred to in said in-
struction were in the realm of speculation because the 
evidence which the jury had to consider in determining 
these matters was inadmissible and insufficient to support 
a claim of damages. Under point V of this brief the 
reasons why this evidence was inadmissible are argued at 
length. Based upon the reasons therein stated it is sub-
mitted the instruction was erroneous. This instruction 
was likewise improper because, as pointed out under 
Point VI of this brief the jury was improperly permitted 
to find the issues in plaintiffs' favor when there is no 
proof that defendant's actions proximately caused the 
damage claimed by plaintiffs. 
Defendant excepted to the giving of instruction 
No. 12 because it ignored the defense of good faith upon 
which defendant was entitled to rely. Under Point VII 
of this brief appears the argument of defendant with 
respect to this defense. This instruction should have at 
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least been modified to the extent of informing the jury 
that even though it might appear by a preponderance 
of the evidence that plaintiffs could not get financing 
because of defendant's unreleased mortgages, the verdict 
should nevertheless be for the defendant, if the jury 
found that the defendant acted in good faith. 
Furthermore, this instruction was contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence in that the real 
estate mortgages were never in fact satisfied and because 
the chattel mortgages secured the unpaid debt of plain-
tiffs and consequently plaintiffs were not entitled to de-
mand releases. Under Points II and III of this brief appear 
all of the arguments which sustain defendant's objec-
tions to this instruction. 
The defendant objected to the giving of instruction 
No. 13 relating to the sufficiency of a demand for a 
release of mortgage. The basis of this objection is the lack 
of any evidence of a demand for such releases ever hav-
ing been made by plain tiffs. It is clear that no demand 
for release of real estate mortgages was ever made. See 
arguments under Point II of this brief. Under Point III of 
this brief appears the argument that there is no evidence 
of any demand made by plaintiffs for release of chattel 
mortgages prior to 1954. For the reasons stated under 
Points II and III the giving of instruction No. 13 was 
error. 
Instruction No. 14 given by the court embodied 
plaintiffs' request No. 4. It instructed the jury on the 
various modes in which a mortgage may be satisfied, in-
cluding merger in a later or subsequent mortgage. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record that a 
merger of any of the mortgages involved in this case ever 
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occurred or was intended to occur. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that the instruction was a mere abstract state-
ment of a legal principle unsupported by any evidence in 
the record. The giving of such an instruction was error. 
Most grievous error was committed by the trial court 
in giving instruction No. 16. Plaintiffs' counsel invited 
the court into this error by his request No. 6 (a), which 
was given as requested. 
In substance the instruction advised the jury that 
more than one proximate cause might exist and that if 
the acts or omissions of two or more persons work con-
currently to cause an injury each act or omission may be 
regarded as a proximate cause. 
In the first place the plaintiffs predicated the whole 
theory of their case upon the proposition that it was the 
act of defendant in failing or refusing to release mort-
gages which was the sole cause of plaintiffs' injury or 
damage. Therefore, the instruction given by the trial 
court was contrary to and in contradiction of plaintiffs' 
theory. Furthermore, the instruction assumed the exist-
ence of other causes brought about by the wrongful acts 
of third parties. There was no evidence of any wrong 
or act committed by a third party which, acting concur-
rently with the acts of defendant, jointly caused dam-
ages to plaintiffs. This instruction had no proper place 
in this case. It is an instruction which is applicable to a 
negligence case in which the evidence may justify a find-
ing that more than one person caused an injury. Instead 
of giving this instruction the court should have instructed 
the jury that before a verdict could be rendered for plain-
tiffs they were required to find by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the acts of defendant were the sole 
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proximate cause of injury to plaintiffs. Under Point VI 
appear the arguments and authorities holding that in a 
case where more than one cause of damage may exist only 
one of which is chargeable to the defendant, before a ver-
dict may be reached the jury must :find that the injury 
was caused solely by the wrong of the defendant. Until 
the jury was able to say from the preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiffs' credit applications would 
have been granted if defendant had released its various 
mortgages no recovery in favor of the plaintiffs could 
be permitted. That the record in this case fails to show 
that any applications of plaintiffs would have been 
granted if defendant had released is abundantly demon-
strated in this record. 
After instructing the jury in instruction No. 17 that 
good faith constitutes a defense in an action for refusing 
to release a mortgage, the court proceeded by paragraph 
three of that instruction to advise the jury that if de-
fendant was not rightfully insisting upon an additional 
payment as a condition to releasing its mortgages, then 
defendant was not acting in good faith. It is submitted 
that a creditor may mistakenly demand a payment he 
is not entitled to which would not be right and yet still 
act in perfect good faith in making the demand. 
This part of the instruction was highly prejudicial 
and erroneous. In the first place, there is no evidence to 
support the instruction that defendant was motivated by 
a desire to coerce or by other improper motives. It is 
not disputed by plaintiffs that they were in debt to the 
defendant for over $5 ,000.00. Much less than 10% of 
this sum was requested in consideration of giving a sub-
ordination agreement. Defendant had a right to demand 
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payment of its entire debt which was then owing and 
had been owing for three years. Believing as it did, that 
its mortgages were not satisfied and acting upon the ad-
vice of its counsel not to release its mortgages, which is 
undisputed and uncontradicted, it could, without acting 
in bad faith, impose conditions upon its giving of a re-
lease or subordination agreement. Demanding a token 
payment on a debt is not wrongful. 
In addition, the amount demanded represented the 
value of turkeys mortgaged to the defendant in 1951 
which Nalder, Jr. wrongfully and illegally disposed of to 
pay his gas bill. The mortgage (Ex. A 3) required plain-
tiffs to account to defendant for the proceeds of all 
turkeys raised with the feed and money supplied by de-
fendant. The evidence instead of showing any wrong 
or oppressive action in demanding an accounting for those 
turkeys shows the leniency of defendant in not demand-
ing payment of the entire balance owing from plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs recognized that the demand made by de-
fendant was reasonable. (Ex. D 17, 19) (Tr. 301, 302, 
323, 154, 155) It should be remembered that at the time 
defendant was willing to subordinate its mortgages it 
could have commenced proceedings to foreclose. Instead 
of doing so it waited for three years in the vain hope 
that plaintiffs would make an honest effort to pay their 
debt. It was only after the defendant insisted upon pay-
ment that this unwarranted and unjustified action was 
commenced. Here again plaintiffs' counsel led the court 
into reversible error by his requested Instruction No. 10. 
Instruction No. 18 contains the same basic defects 
as Instruction No. 16. It is the embodiment of plaintiffs' 
request No. 6 (b). This instruction permitted the jury 
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to speculate that wrongful acts committed by third per-
sons, not parties to the action, may have combined with 
the acts of the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiffs. 
There is absolutely no evidence of any wrong committed 
by any third party. Therefore, the instruction had no 
basis in the evidence before the court. Furthermore, it 
was an improper instruction because not applicable to 
this case. It is an instruction frequently encountered in 
personal injury cases where joint or concurrent acts of 
negligence have produced an injury. 
It is submitted that the instruction as applied to this 
case was misleading and was calculated to produce in the 
mind of the jury the impression that the court believed 
the defendant and others in some way, not disclosed by 
any evidence, caused injury to the plaintiffs. Here again 
the jury should have been instructed that where there are 
several possible explanations for a cause of injury only 
one of which may be attributed to the defendant, then it 
must affirmatively appear that the damage complained 
of would not have occurred except for the conduct of 
the defendant. 
Objection was made to instruction No. 19 which 
stated that any notice to Schinker and Aust that plain-
tiffs had made a demand for release of mortgages was 
notice to defendant. It is submitted that there is insuf-
ficient evidence of any notice having been brought to 
the attention of Aust or Schinker. Therefore, there was 
no basis for the giving of this instruction. 
The court refused defendant's requests No. 1, 6 and 
14 which defendant submits was error. 
Defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed 
that the filing of a suit by plaintiffs created no inference 
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that plaintiffs were entitled to recover. This is a correct 
statement of the law and was applicable to this case. The 
denial of defendant's request No. 1 was error. 
Defendant's request No. 6 was based upon the theory 
that the jury could properly find from the evidence that 
the plaintiffs' turkey raising business was unestablished 
and hence they could claim no damages for its alleged 
destruction or injury. The law is well settled as shown 
by the authorities set out under Point IV that no dam-
ages for lost profits to an unestablished business or one 
merely in contemplation may be recovered. The evidence 
in the case shows that the turkey raising venture of 
plainiffs was precarious, unsuccessful and not possessing 
the degree of permanence and stability to justify any 
claim for damages by reason of loss of alleged profits. 
By its request No. 14 defendant requested that the 
jury be instructed that before any action for damages 
for failure to release mortgages could be maintained a 
demand was essential. This instruction the court did not 
give. This was error as appears from the authorities and 
argument under Point II of this brief. The issue of de-
mand was one of the vital and important issues involved 
in this case to which much of this record is devoted. It 
being the contention of the defendant that the record 
discloses that no demand for releases was ever made by 
plaintiffs, the instruction requested on this important 
issue should have been given. It is submitted that the 
record amply justifies the requested instruction. 
POINT XI 
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING CERTAIN 
ITEMS OF DEFENDANT'S COST BILL ON APPEAL. 
Following the order reversing the judgment on the 
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former appeal in which defendant was awarded costs, de-
fendant filed its cost bill for items incurred in that ap-
peal. (R. 23) Among the items claimed was the sum 
of $682.84 which represented the premium defendant 
was required to pay for an appeal and supersedeas bond. 
That judgment was for over $90,000.00. The supersedeas 
was necessary because following the entry of that judg-
ment the plaintiffs commenced garnishment proceedings 
to attach the accounts of the defendant. Also included 
in that cost bill was the item of $19.80 for filing the 
record on appeal. Both items of costs referred to were 
necessarily incurred by defendant in prosecuting said ap-
peal. Under rule 54d ( 3) these costs should have been 
allowed. See Everts v. Barker, 58 Utah 519, 200 Pac. 473. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case establishes that plaintiffs 
are indebted to defendant for the amount demanded in 
defendant's answer and counterclaim. On the other hand, 
the record clearly demonstrates that defendant was fully 
entitled to retain all mortgages of record, and that it did 
so acting in good faith and upon advice of counsel. 
There is a complete failure of proof that the existence 
of defendant's mortgages upon the records was the cause 
of plaintiffs' alleged losses and the judgment in plaintiffs' 
favor is founded upon incompetent evidence of damage. 
Judgment was granted in favor of H. William Nalder, 
Jr. for failure to release real estate mortgages not signed 
or executed by him and after he had abandoned the 
turkey business. 
For all of the reasons referred to in this brief the 
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judgment should be reversed with directions to enter 
judgment for defendant for the amount due upon its 
mortgage and to enter a decree of foreclosure and order 
of sale and dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
ALBERT R. BOWEN, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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